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COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, 
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OF TRANSPORTATION, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
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----------------------------------------------' 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HIGHLAND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, ) 
a Utah corporation, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 
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vs. ) 
) 
LaMAR D. STEVENSON d/b/a LaMAR ) 
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COMPANY, a Maryland corporation; ) 
and SHELL OIL COMPANY, a Delaware ) 
corporation, ) 
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LaMAR D. STEVENSON d/b/a LaMAR ) 
D. CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, ) 
) 
Third-Party Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
THE STATE OF UTAH and THE UTAH ) 
STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, ) 
) 
Third-Party Defendant. ) 
__________________________ ) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff Highland Construction Company ("High-
land") first asserted a claim against Shell Oil Company 
("Shell") in an Amended Complaint filed 6 months after 
this action was initiated. Plaintiff sought to recover 
against Shell on two theories: promissory estoppel and 
negligence. Specifically, Highland alleged that Shell 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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breached a promise to it to relocate a gas line within 
three days and that Shell's failure to complete the re-
location within three days constituted negligence. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The bench trial of this act ion began on Sep-
tember 1 0, 1979. Plaintiff completed the presentation 
of its evidence on September 13, 1979, at which time 
defendant Shell moved for a dismissal of plaintiff's 
claims against it on the ground that plaintiff had 
shown no right to relief. The trial ·court took this 
motion under advisement, and adjourned the trial until 
November 13, 1979. On that day the court heard further 
argument on the motion and granted it. Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Judgment dismissing 
the Amended Complaint as against Shell were entered. 
Trial continued with respect to the remaining claims 
and counterclaims. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant Shell seeks an order of this Court 
affirming the Judgment dismissing plaintiff's claims 
against it. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As plaintiff's statement of facts suggests, 
the evidence on which it bases its claim against Shell 
-2-
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is minimal. Defendant Shell owns a natural gas line 
that crosses the roadway that the Department of Trans-
portation was improving. (Ex. 18, R. 724). On July 
24, 1976 Shell entered into a contract with the Depart-
ment to perform all work and provide all materials 
necessary to relocate and encase the gas line beneath 
the roadway (Ex. 15, R. 645). Shell had no contract 
nor any agreement or understanding with defendant LaMar 
D. Stevenson, the prime contractor, or with plaintiff 
Highland, which had a subcontract to do the earthwork 
on the project. 
On August 3, 1976, at the invitation of the 
Department of Transportation's project engineer, Larry 
Buss, all parties interested in the project met at 
Duchesne, Utah for a preconstruction conference (k. 
724-25). Shell was represented by Harry Nash, its 
plant foreman, and Highland was represented by Bryan 
Bergener, its president (Ex. 56, R. 1150-51). Plain-
tiff and Shell had never communicated before this con-
ference, nor were there any communications after it (R. 
1151-53). 
Plaintiff bases its claim against Shell sole-
ly on a comment that Mr. Nash made at the preconstruc-
tion conference. It contends that Nash's statement 
-3-
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that the gas line would be relocated in four days con-
stituted an enforceable promise. 
Larry Buss made a tape recording of the con-
ference, and a transcript of the parts of it relevant 
to plaintiff's claim against Shell was admitted in 
evidence pursuant to stipulation. (Ex. 56). Because 
plaintiff's claims against Shell, and the propriety of 
the trial court's dismissal of them, turn almost en-
tirely on what was said at the meeting, this transcript 
is set forth in full, with Mr. Nash's alleged "promise" 
underlined: 
LARRY BUSS: I believe we' 11 go ahead 
and start. It's 10:30. We are missing 
the telephone and power people and if we 
have any problems, we' 11 get in touch 
with these particular utilities. I 
guess we ought to start with introduc-
tions. I'm Larry Buss, the project 
engineer on the project and my secretary 
here, Carrie Hall, and let's go right 
around and introduce each one and tell 
what you -- who you represent and your 
title. 
I'm Mrs. LaMar Stevenson. 
retary. 
I'm his sec-
I'm LaMar D. Stevenson, the contractor. 
I'm Myron Taylor, District 6 Maintenance 
Engineer • 
• • • District 6 Supervisor. 
Paul Traynor (?), District 6 Materials 
Engineer: 
-4-
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Leo Brady, I'm with the Pioneer Canal 
Company; 
Melvin White, Pioneer Canal Company. 
Leland Wright, Pioneer Canal. 
Curtis Wilson (?), District Construction 
Engineer. 
Harry Nash, Shell Plant Foreman 
• • • Chevron Pipe. 
Connie (?) Cowans, Safety, District 6. 
BUSS: Come on in, just in time. The 
rest of the people have been introduced. 
Would you men like to introduce your-
selves and tell who you represent? 
[BERGENER] : My name is Bryan Bergener 
and I represent Highland Construction 
Company. This is Wayne Davies, Highland 
Construction. 
BUSS: Very fine. Carrie, will you 
start that list around, if you would, 
please. Okay, the first part we'd like 
to discuss any utilities problems that 
may come up; and then we' 11 excuse the 
utilities people and continue on hashing 
out a few other items. \Jould you like 
to -- those utility people -- would you 
like to tell what your schedule is for 
completing your utilities relocations so 
that you might -- the contractor might 
have an idea when to expect those items 
to be moved or completed? 
CHEVRON ~EPRESENTATIVE: 
almost complete; it'll be, 
or Friday. 
BUSS: That's with Chevron. 
Our 
oh, 
CHEVRON REP~ESENTATIVE: Chevron. 
BUSS: Very good. 
-5-
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NASH: Yeah we haven't done an thin • 
We're read to start. De ends actual-
ly?) on what your timing is, when you 
want it done. We' re looking at about 
four days, I imagine. 
BERGENER (?) : 
have it done? 
Within four days you can 
STEVENSON: That'll be fine. The quick-
er the better. We'd like to start on 
the lower end first. We won't be able 
to start there, but we'd like to start 
there. Just as soon as the concrete 
lined ditch is out of our hair and the 
utilities and fencing. We'd like to 
start there and start with- our oiling 
operation there, but meanwhile, we'll 
work right outside of it. 
NASH: (Inaudible.) 
BUSS: We have got that slope-staked in 
the area so that you could go with the 
stakes that are there and determine what 
you need. 
NASH: All right (?), we'll get started 
on it. 
[BUSS] : Okay. Very fine, now we go to 
the Pioneer Canal. 
(Ex. 56). 
Question marks on this Exhibit indicate the 
parts of the tape recording that were not entirely 
clear when the transcript was made. However, in his 
testimony Mr. Bergener, Highland's president, confirmed 
that it was he who asked, "Within four days you can 
have it done?" 
' 
immediately after Mr. Nash made his 
statement (R. 1151). Also, Mr. Bergener testified that 
-6-
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he had never seen Mr. Nash before this meeting and that 
the contents of the transcript (Ex. 56) are all of the 
communications of any kind that he ever had with Shell 
Oil Company (R. 1152-53). The record also shows that 
Mr. Nash and other utility representatives were excused 
from the meeting shortly after Mr. Nash made his 
statement (R. 1151), and, except for the general 
comments made by Mr. Stevenson (Ex. 56), Shell never 
had any information about the plans for moving earth on 
the project. 
On August 10, Shell began its work on the gas 
line relocation (R. 651 ). Mr. Nash's estimate of the 
time it would take to complete the work was inaccurate 
because in excavating the trench through which the gas 
line and its casing were laid Shell ran into a great 
deal of water and was substantially slowed (R. 651, 
1188). Shell worked at least 12 hours a day every day, 
including Saturdays and Sundays, from August 10 to 
August 25 (R. 1160-61). Although Mr. Bergener testi-
fied that he could have completed the work more quick-
ly, he never testified that he had any first-hand know-
ledge of the actual conditions under which Shell was 
working, or of the details of the work Shell was doing 
(R. 830-31, 1188). There is certainly no evidence of 
-7-
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any kind in the record to indicate that Shell was neg-
ligent in the performance of its work. 
Plaintiff contended that its large earth mov-
ing vehicles ("scrapers") were slowed by Shell's acti-
vities on the project, and that it was damaged thereby 
(R. 894-906). On certain days Shell was working close 
to the roadway the scrapers tr ave led. Highland, how-
ever, had substantial problems proving the time it al-
legedly lost. Bryan Bergener admitted that each point 
of his calculations was based on assumptions and esti-
mates and that the delay caused by other problems on 
the project could not reasonably be separated from the 
delay caused by Shell's work (R. 872-74). 
Highland failed not only to prove any basis 
for Shell's liability, but also failed to prove a rea-
sonable basis for calculating damages. The trial judge 
correctly found that Mr. Nash's statement is exactly 
what it appears to be: an estimate or a statement of 
intentions, not a promise (R. 538, Findings 15 & 16). 
It also found that each other element of promissory 
estoppel had not been proved (R. 538-39, Findings 17, 
18 & 20), and that the evidence of damages was too un-
certain and speculative to allow recovery (R. 540, 
Finding 24). There is substantial competent evidence 
-8-
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in the record, most of it undisputed, to support the 
Findings and Conclusions on which the trial court's 
dismissal of Highland's claim against Shell was based. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT 
PLAINTIFF HAD FAILED TO PROVE P~OMISSORY 
ESTOPPEL AGAINST SHELL. 
In this action, Shell's only contract was 
with the Utah Department of Transportation (Ex. 15). 
Its activities on the project site were completely in-
dependent of any contractual arrangement with either 
plaintiff Highland or the prime contractor, defendant 
Stevenson. 
It is a fundamental principle of contract law 
that, with certain exceptions, a promise will not be 
enforced against the promiser unless the promisee gives 
some consideration for it. In its Amended Complaint 
(in contrast to its brief on appeal), plaintiff recog-
nized that it had given no consideration for the "pro-
mise" allegedly received from Shell, and, to circumvent 
this problem, carefully pled each element of promissory 
estoppel (R. 17 5- 77). However, at the conclusion of 
its evidence, plaintiff had failed to prove even one of 
these elements. 
The doctrine of promissory estoppel, which 
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may be invoked in proper circumstances to enforce a 
promise without consideration, is set out in Section 
90, Restatement of Contracts: 
§90. PROMISE REASONABLY INDUCING DEFI-
NITE AND SUBSTANTIAL ACTION. 
A promise which the promisor should rea-
sonably expect to induce action or for-
bearance of a definite and substantial 
character on the part of the promisee 
and which does induce such action or 
forbearance is binding if injustice can 
be avoided only by enforcement of the 
promise. 
The validity of Section 90 had been acknowledged by 
this Court in several cases, e.g., Easton v. Wycoff, 4 
Utah 2d 386, 295 P.2d 332 (1956); Petty v. Gindy Manu-
facturing Corp., 17 Utah 2d 32, 404 P.2d 30 (1965); 
Quagliana v. Exquisite Horne Builders, Inc., 538 P.2d 
301 (Utah 1975). The showing that a proponent of pro-
missory estoppel must make is clearly set out in Sec-
tion 90. This Court has repeatedly ruled that the doc-
trine should not be applied lightly. For example, in 
Petty v. Gindy Manufacturing, supra, the Court said: 
In approaching the question as to the 
applicability of promissory estoppel • • 
• there are some precepts which should 
be kept in mind. The first is that it 
would be somewhat at variance with trad-
itional rules of contract law. • • • 
This [application] would impose liabil-
ity in the nature of a contractual obli-
gation in the absence of the classic es-
sentials: a promise and a consideration. 
-10-
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For this reason it is resorted to only 
where circumstances are such that eguity 
and good conscience render its applica-
tion imperative in order to avoid an ob-
vious unfairness and injustice. Further 
prerequisites • • • are that the promise 
or representation relied on must be suf-
ficiently definite and certain that the 
plaintiff acting as a reasonable and 
prudent person under the circumstances 
would be justified in placing reliance 
upon it and in case of uncertainty or 
doubt the responsibility is upon the 
plaintiff to ascertain the facts before 
acting upon it. 
17 Utah 2d at 35 (emphasis added). ·In Union Tank Car 
Company v. Wheat Brothers, 15 Utah 2d 101, 387 P.2d 
1000 (1965), the Court emphasized that defendants must 
be "aware of all the material facts [and] in such 
awareness [make] the promise knowing that the plaintiff 
[is] acting in reliance on it"' 15 Utah 2d at 104. 
A. Mr. Nash's Statements At The Preconstruc-
tion Conference Did Not Constitute A Promise. 
Plaintiff's claim against Shell in promissory 
estoppel is premised entirely on Mr. Nash's statement 
at the precons truction conference. In reply to a re-
quest from the project engineer to explain Shell's ex-
pected schedule for completing the relocation, Nash 
replied, "Yeah, we haven't done anything. We' re ready 
to start. Depends actually on what your timing is when 
you want it done. We' re looking at about four days I 
-11-
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imagine." (Ex. 56). This does not sound like a pro-
mise; Mr. Nash had no reason to think he was making a 
promise; and Mr. Bergener never considered it a pro-
mise. 
A promise is defined in Section 2, !{estate-
rnent (Second) of Contracts (Tentative Drafts 1-7 
(1973)) as " • • • a manifestation of intention to act 
or refrain from acting in a specified way, so as to 
justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment 
has been made." (Emphasis added.) Whether a purported 
promise will be enforced turns in part "on the formal-
ity with which the promise is made [and] on the extent 
to which the evidentiary, cautionary, deterrent and 
channeling functions of form are met by the commercial 
setting or otherwise. " Comment b. to Section 90, • • • 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts (Tentative Drafts 1-7 
(1973)). The functions of form, or formality, are set 
out in Comment c. to Section 76, Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts (Tentative Drafts 1-7 (1973)) as follows: 
Four principal functions have been iden-
tified which legal formalities in gener-
al may serve: the evidentiary function, 
to provide evidence of the existence and 
terms of the contract; the cautionary 
function, to guard the promisor against 
ill-considered action; the deterrent 
function, to discourage transactions of 
doubtful utility; and the channeling or 
signalizing function, to distinguish a 
-12-
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particular type of transaction from 
other types and from tentative or ex-
ploratory expressions of intention and 
the way the coinage distinguishes money 
from other metal. • . • " (Emphasis in 
original). 
See, also, Granfield v. Catholic University of America, 
530 F.2d 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1976), in which the mode or 
manner of communication of the purported promise is 
discussed as a factor to be considered in assessing a 
claim based on promissory estoppel. 
While plaintiff claims it was "formal" , the 
preconstruction conference cannot be considered a "com-
mercial setting". When it was called, all bargains had 
already been struck. The prime contractor, Stevenson, 
had made its agreement with the State and with its sub-
contractors, including plaintiff; and the State had 
made its arrangements with the various canal companies, 
utilities, and oil companies that had an interest in 
the relocation of their property on the project. The 
purpose of the preconstruction meeting was, as Mr. Buss 
stated, to give the contractor an "idea" as to when the 
relocation of the various utilities would be completed. 
To impose contractual commitments based on statements 
made at a preconstruction conference might substantial-
ly impair these various contractual arrangements, and 
could substantially defeat the purpose of the conference. 
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The trial court so found (R. 539, Finding 21). 
The "formalities" of Mr. Nash's statement and 
Mr. Bergener's response to it do not indicate that it 
was a promise. Mr. Nash's statement itself is obvious-
ly a tentative and and exploratory expression of inten-
tion and would not "signalize" to any reasonable person 
that Nash himself thought he was making a promise. In 
the context of a preconstruction conference, the form 
of the expression itself and Mr. Bergener's response to 
it were not designed to guard Mr. Nash against ill-con-
sidered action. Clearly, Mr. Nash's statement was not 
"sufficiently definite and certain that the plaintiff 
[Highland], acting as a reasonable and prudent person 
under the circumstances [could] be justified in placing 
reliance on it." Petty v. Gindy Manufacturing Corp., 
17 Utah 2d at 35. 
Indeed, it is quite clear from the record 
that Mr. Bergener never considered Mr. Nash's statement 
a promise until much later, when his attorneys had had 
time to reflect on it. In its Amended Complaint and 
throughout the discovery documents, plaintiff remem-
bered that Mr. Nash said three days, not four days. 
When Mr. Bergener heard the tape recording shortly 
before the trial, he conceded that four days was 
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correct (R. 1153-54). Although this difference would 
not be important in most contexts, Mr. Bergener could 
be expected to remember accurately a "promise" which he 
claims was so important to his work and profits. 
Until plaintiff served the Amended Complaint, 
it had never even suggested to Shell that it thought a 
promise had been made and broken. Almost anyone, and 
certainly Mr. Bergener, would have brought such a pro-
mise and its breach to Shell's attention innnediately. 
Mr. Bergener was aware of his problems and the possi-
bility of a financial loss on the project even before 
Highland's work was completed. He wasted no time in 
making claims of varying formality against both Steven-
son and the Department of Transportation. One of 
these, a written claim made in January, 1977, after the 
completion of Highland's work, was obviously prepared 
with much thought and care (R. 1152, 1171). Yet, des-
pite his attention to plaintiff's problems on the pro-
ject, and his careful itemization of its claims, Mr. 
Bergener never once let Shell know of the purported 
breach of promise. 
B. Mr. Nash Had No Reason To Expect That His 
Statement Would Induce Action Or Forbearance Of A Defi-
nite And Substantial Character On The Part Of Highland 
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Construction. 
As this Court emphasized in Union Tank Car 
Company v. Wheat Brothers, supra, before an enforceable 
promise will be imposed, a defendant must be aware of 
all material facts and make the promise in the context 
of such awareness. 15 Utah 2d at 104. The Restatement 
requires that a promiser should "reasonably expect [his 
promise] to induce action or forbearance of a definite 
and substantial character." 
There is no dispute that the few casual re-
marks made by Mr. Nash and Mr. Bergener at the precon-
struction conference are the sum of all communications 
between plaintiff and defendant Shell. Mr. Nash was 
. 
never made aware of any material facts. When he made 
the statement at the conference he knew only that Mr. 
Bergener represented Highland. There is no evidence 
that Nash knew even that Highland had a contract to 
move earth on the project. The only comments made at 
the conference that could be construed as an explana-
tion of contemplated action were Mr. Stevenson's gener-
alized statement of what he, not Highland, wanted to 
do. Mr. Bergener never once explained his plans while 
Shell was in attendance at the conference. 
C. Mr. Nash's Statements Did Not Induce Action 
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Or Forbearance Of A Definite And Substantial Character 
On The Part of Plaintiff. 
Mr. Nash's statement did not induce action or 
forbearance of any kind at all, let alone of a definite 
and substantial character. In his testimony at trial, 
Mr. Bergener said: 
Q. Now in response to a question of Mr. 
Martineau' s yesterday you said when 
you heard Mr. Nash say four days, 
that it would take four ·.days to do 
Shell's work, you thought in effect 
that is fine we can go ahead and do 
it like we planned. Does that sum-
marize your testimony yesterday ac-
curately? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what was this 
thought you could 
effect? 
plan 
then 
that 
put 
you 
into 
A. We felt like that what we could do 
is start our excavation on the far 
west end of the job at station 8 
plus 78 and work continuously 
through the job, through the east 
end of the job, and, of course, we 
had various reasons for that and one 
thing, but that was our plan. 
Q. Did you in fact begin to put this 
plan into effect? 
A. Yes. 
Highland did exactly what it had always plan-
ned to do. Nash's statement changed nothing. Nothing 
in the record suggests that had Mr. Nash correctly 
-17-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
estimated the time it would take Shell to complete its 
work, Highland would have formulated a plan different 
from that stated by Mr. Bergener. 
D. The Trial Court Found Correctly That It 
Would Be Unjust To Enforce Mr. Nash's Statements As A 
Promise. 
The last condition of Restatement of Con-
tracts, Section 90, requires that before a promise 
without return consideration may be enforced, the Court 
must find that "injustice can be avoided only by en-
forcement of the promise." In this action the trial 
court found it would be unjust to enforce Mr. Nash's 
statements as a promise (R. 539, Finding 21). 
The trial court considered that Shell had 
worked at least 12 hours every day, including Saturdays 
and Sundays, from August 10 to August 25 to complete 
its work, and that the work went much more slowly than 
expected because of the subsurface water that seeped 
into the trench. Mr. Bergener thought that he could 
have done the work more quickly himself, but there was 
little foundation for his opinion. He admitted that 
Highland itself had been surprised, and its work was 
substantially slowed, because of unexpected subsurface 
water. A major part of Highland's claim against 
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Stevenson is based on this fact. 
The trial court also thought it significant 
that Highland had never communicated with Shell con-
cerning the problems caused by Shell's operations on 
the project. Although it is doubtful that Shell could 
have expended much more effort than it did, some sort 
of cooperative effort might have been made to alleviate 
plaintiff's problems. As discussed above, this lack of 
communication is also relevant to whether Hr. Nash's 
statement was even a promise, and would tend, in gener-
al, to show there was nothing in the form of a contrac-
tual commitment between Shell and Highland. 
The trial court found that it would be unjust 
to bind Mr. Nash to statements made at a preconstruc-
tion conference. Mr. Buss, in asking Mr. Nash to make 
his statement, had said that the purpose was to give 
the contractor an "idea" when to expect the relocation 
to be completed. The give and take that one would as-
sume is necessary for a successful preconstruction con-
ference, both in terms of scheduling and anticipation 
of problems, would be impaired if statements made were 
enforced as promises. And of course no one at the con-
ference expected his statements to be construed as pro-
mises. Finally, the trial court found that the delay 
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caused Highland's scrapers as they moved through the 
area in which Shell was working could not easily be 
distinguished from the delays caused by other factors. 
In summary, plaintiff was required to clear 
several hurdles before its claim of promissory estoppel 
was established. It failed to clear any of them. Con-
sidering the nature of Mr. Nash's expression and the 
context in which it was made, no reasonable person 
could have thought it was a promise. Mr. Bergener ob-
viously did not think it was, or he would have taken 
some action long before be did. Even if Mr. Nash's 
statements were construed as a promise, there is no 
basis at all for finding that he reasonably should have 
known that it would induce action or forbearance of a 
definite and substantial character on the part of High-
land, and it is clear that it did not induce sucn ac-
tion or forbearance. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT 
PLAINTIFF HAD FAILED TO PROVE THAT SHELL WAS 
NEGLIGENT. 
The language of plaintiff's negligence count 
against Shell suggests that plaintiff is relying on the 
rule stated in Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 
323, which provides: 
§323. Negligent Performance of Under-
taking to Render Services. 
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One _who ur:dertakes, gratuitously or for 
consideration, to render services to 
another which he should recognize as 
necessary for the protection of the 
other's person or things, is subject to 
liability to the other for physical harm 
resulting from his failure to exercise 
reasonable care to perform his under-
taking, if 
(a) his failure to exercise such care 
increases the risk of such harm, or 
(b) the harm is suffered because of the 
other's reliance upon the undertaking. 
This reliance is clearly misplaced. Shell did 
not "undertake to render services" to plaintiff. It 
undertook to render services only to the State Depart-
ment of Transportation. Plaintiff is not claiming 
damages to its "person or things," it is claiming econ-
ornic damages. Had Shell entered an undertaking to pro-
vide services to plaintiff, economic damages for fail-
ure to perform properly would be recoverable as a 
breach of the contract, not as a tort. If the rule 
were otherwise, every breach of contract to perform 
services would also be a tort. The trial court con-
eluded correctly that when plaintiff failed to prove 
the contractual duty asserted in its estoppel claim, 
plaintiff had failed to establish any duty or standard 
of care owed plaintiff by 8hell (k. 540, Conclusion 4). 
If plaintiff was relying on general concepts 
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of negligence, rather than the specific rules of Sec-
tion 323, it still failed entirely to establish any 
duty that Shell owed Highland, and failed to show any 
breach of duty. At trial there was simply no legal 
argument advanced nor evidence offered that, as a mat-
ter of trade practice or otherwise, a party relocating 
its property on a construction project such as this is 
accountable to the construction contractors for delay, 
particularly when the delay is caused.· in large part by 
unforeseen circumstances. 
Mr. Bergener admitted that he never observed 
Shell's work on the project and knew of the problems 
Shell encountered only by hearsay. In fact he admitted 
that it was reported to him that Shell was "doing 
everything humanly possible to get the pipeline moved." 
(R. 1188). His opinion that Shell could have worked 
more quickly must be discounted because of the absence 
of any direct knowledge of Shell's work. In fact, as 
the trial judge implied, Mr. Bergener's opinion is im-
peached by Highland's own problems with subsurface 
water on the project, which he testified were unexpect-
ed and substantially slowed plaintiff's operations (R. 
1188, 842-43, 930-34). 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THERE 
WAS NO REASONABLE BASIS OF CALCULATION FOR 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM OF DAMAGES AGAINST SHELL. 
A "reasonable basis of calculation" must be 
afforded before approximate damages of the sort claimed 
by plaintiff can be awarded. Security Development Com-
pany v. Fed co, Inc. , 23 Utah 2d 306, 462 P. 2d 706 
(1969). Throughout his testimony, even on direct exam-
ination, Mr. Bergener stated that each point of plain-
tiff's damage calculations is based on assumptions or 
estimates (R. 873). 
To arrive at the damage figure Mr. Bergener 
was required first to assume how many trips through 
Shell's construction area were made by Highland's 
scrapers, then to estimate on how many of these trips 
the scrapers were slowed (R. 848). He then had to as-
surne the average speed the scrapers might have main-
tained through Shell's work area (R. 894) and the 
average speed in fact maintained (R. 894). In this 
connection, he assumed the distance from Shell's gas 
line crossing that the scrapers began to slow down and 
the distance it took them to regain normal speed (R. 
894). Finally, he had to assume that for every minute 
one of the scrapers was delayed, all of his men and 
equipment on the job were delayed for an equal amount 
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of time (R. 898). 
There was evidence at trial that many of these 
assumptions were based on extremely shaky premises. 
Bergener had no idea of how many days Shell was working 
near and outside the right-of-way lines and not slowing 
his scrapers at all (R. 1167-68). Plaintiff was appa-
rently claiming that it was slowed simultaneously by 
Shell and by soft and yielding spots n~ar Shell's oper-
ations (R. 1164-65). It was doubtful that the scrapers 
would have approached Shell's construction area at full 
speed, since flagmen were on duty in the area to govern 
the convergence of construction vehicles and the 
traveling public (R. 1164). Mr. Bergener testified 
that he estimated that the scrapers began slowing from 
25 to 5 m.p.h. 400 feet from Shell's work area and did 
not resume full speed for another 400 feet after (R. 
1165). His own employee, Mr. Gines, thought 100 feet 
on each side sounded reasonable (R. 777). 
Bergener testified that all of Highland's 
problems with Shell, with large culverts that 
Stevenson did not complete quickly enough, and with 
soft and yielding spots -- were so interrelated that it 
would be "impractical" to try to isolate the time lost 
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because of any one of them (R. 872-74). 
The trial court was justified in concluding 
that plaintiff had failed to provide a reasonable basis 
of calculation for its damages against Shell. 
SUMMARY 
The trial court granted defendant Shell's 
Motion to Dismiss after the presentation of plaintiff's 
evidence, and Findings were entered as required by Rule 
41(b), U.R.C.P. "In such circumstances [this Court] 
review[ s] the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the findings." Petty v. Gindy Manufacturing Company, 
17 Utah 2d 32, 34, 404 P.2d 30 (1965), citing, Lawrence 
v. Bamberger Railroad Company, 3 Utah 2d 247, 282 P.2d 
335 (1955). Since all of the evidence was presented in 
plaintiff's case in chief, there was little dispute 
about it. Plaintiff clearly failed to prove promissory 
estoppel or negligence. 
Shell made no promise. There is no dispute 
about the statement which plaintiff contended was a 
promise. Mr. Nash, Shell's agent, said, "[It] depends 
on • • • when you want it [the gas line relocation] 
done. We' re looking at about four days, I imagine." 
The trial court properly found from the form of the 
statement and its context that it was an estimate or an 
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expression of opinion, not a promise. Plaintiff's con-
duct in waiting almost a year and a half to assert the 
purported promise or make demands pursuant to it, sup-
ports this finding. 
Shell could not have expected its statement 
to induce action or forbearance by plaintiff. Mr. 
Nash, Shell's agent who made the alleged "promise", did 
not know Mr. Bergener, plaintiff's representative, and 
plaintiff's plans were never communicated to Shell at 
any time. 
Shell's statement did not induce action or 
forbearance of a substantial character. Mr. Bergener 
testified that when he heard Shell's statement that it 
would take four days to relocate the gas line, he 
thought, in effect, "Good, we can go ahead and do our 
work as we planned." Nothing was changed by the state-
ment. 
It would be unjust to impose a contract on 
Shell. Mr. Nash's statement was made at a preconstruc-
tion conference to give the construction contractor's 
an "idea" of when the gas line would be relocated. 
Nothing in the context suggested a contractual commit-
ment. Shell worked as expeditiously as possible to 
complete its work. Until its Amended Complaint was 
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filed, plaintiff never gave any notice that it thought 
a promise had been made and broken. 
Plaintiff failed to prove negligence. Plain-
tiff offered no evidence that Shell had a duty to High-
land, or that Shell breached any duty. Mr. Bergener 
testified that he was informed that Shell was doing 
everything "humanly possible" to complete its work as 
quickly as possible. He had no direct knowledge of the 
problems Shell encountered or of the· details of its 
work. 
Plaintiff failed to establish a reasonable 
basis for its damage calculations. Although Plain-
tiff's damage calculations were elaborate, each point 
in them was based on assumptions that had little or no 
direct support. Mr. Bergener, Highland's president, 
testified that he did not think it practical to isolate 
the alleged damages caused by Shell from the damages 
caused by other problems on the project. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's 
Judgment dismissing plaintiff's claims against defen-
dant Shell Oil Company should be affirmed. 
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